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Targeting Subsidies: Employers versus Individuals
Overview — The Public 
Policy Debate
Dramatic and persistent coverage 
disparities between workers in small 
and large firms and between low- 
and high-income workers have led 
to years of debate over whether the 
issue of uninsured Americans would 
be best addressed by subsidizing small 
employers or by subsidizing low-income 
individuals themselves. This brief 
delineates the important advantages 
of subsidizing individuals and families, 
as opposed to employers, in achieving 
the goal of reducing the number of 
uninsured by providing targeted financial 
assistance to those most in need. 
Individual subsidies to the low-income 
population lead to less displacement of 
current private spending and eliminate 
the inequities that result from subsidizing 
workers differently as a function of their 
workplace choices. However, individual 
subsidy programs must take into account 
and plan for potential declines in the 
likelihood that individuals will obtain 
their health insurance coverage through 
employment settings.  
The introduction of bipartisan Senate 
legislation earlier this year has brought 
this debate back into sharp focus. The 
Senate bill, the Small Business Health 
Options Program (SHOP) Act of 2008, 
introduced by Senators Richard Durbin 
(DE), Olympia Snowe (ME), Blanche 
Lincoln (AR), and Norm Coleman (MN), 
would provide annual tax credits to 
the self-employed and to employers of 
up to 100 workers to offset the cost of 
providing coverage to their workers.1 
In addition, it would create a health 
insurance purchasing pool through 
which small employers and the self-
employed could purchase affordable 
health insurance. The central issue is 
whether this legislation would make 
for sound policy or whether resources 
would be better targeted to low-income 
individuals, those most likely to have 
problems affording coverage. 
Coverage Disparities by 
Firm Size and Income
While employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) is the most common form of 
health insurance coverage in the United 
States, the rates of worker coverage 
vary dramatically by size of employer 
and by worker income. Fully 33 percent 
of workers in small firms (those with 
fewer than 25 employees) are uninsured, 
compared with 13 percent of workers 
in the largest firms (1,000 workers 
or more) (Table 1, right-most column, 
bottom section). Fifty percent of poor 
workers are uninsured, as are 40 percent 
of near-poor workers (those with 
incomes between 100 and 200 percent 
of the federal poverty level), compared 
with only 5 percent of workers with 
incomes at or above 500 percent of 
the poverty level (Table 1, right-most 
column, top section). 
In addition to having the highest 
rates of uninsurance, workers in small 
firms account for a large share of total 
uninsured workers. Thirty-five percent 
of uninsured workers are employed in 
firms of fewer than 25 workers, and 49 
percent work for firms of fewer than 
100 (Table 1, column 4, bottom section). 
Recent congressional proposals and reforms advocated by the presidential 
candidates have renewed the debate about whether the problem of the 
uninsured is best addressed through subsidies to employers or to individuals. 
The large number of the uninsured working for small businesses provides 
some political support for subsidizing these firms in an effort to increase 
coverage. However, in this paper, we argue that it is more efficient to 
provide subsidies directly to individuals and families than to employers. 
Subsidies directed specifically to the low-income population will lead to 
less displacement of private spending because that population has low 
rates of private coverage. In addition, subsidies based on income treat those 
in similar economic circumstances the same, eliminating equity concerns 
associated with treating low-income people differently based on their place 
of employment. 
Because employer subsidies are provided based on employer characteristics 
and the limited information that employers have about their workers (and 
because workers within a firm can vary significantly), subsidies are much 
more difficult to target effectively to individuals with the greatest needs. 
Plus, employer subsidies do not eliminate the need for individual subsidies. 
Many employers will not voluntarily begin to offer coverage and not all the 
uninsured are attached to the labor force, so low-income individuals will 
continue to need additional financial support in order to afford coverage.
Individual vs. Employer Subsidies
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The source of these differences seems 
largely attributable to differences in rates of 
offering health insurance across firm sizes. 
In 2005, only 46 percent of workers in firms 
of fewer than 10 workers were offered and 
were eligible to enroll in an ESI plan at their 
workplace, compared with 88 percent of 
workers in firms of 100 or more employees 
(Table 2, column 2, bottom section). As a 
consequence, some have concluded that 
subsidizing small firms in order to increase 
the rate at which they offer health insurance 
to their workers is the logical approach to 
reducing the number of uninsured. 
Others counter with concerns 
about whether employer subsidies 
are sufficiently well targeted to the 
uninsured, whether they would have 
the desired effect on coverage, and 
whether it makes sense to induce more 
small employers to provide insurance, 
given their relative inefficiency as 
purchasers. Skeptics of the employer 
subsidization approach often suggest 
targeting subsidies to low-income 
workers specifically, while providing 
 Workers Percent of Uninsured Percent of Uninsured
 (millions) Workers (millions) Uninsured Rate
Total Workersk  147.1 100.0% 27.6 100.0% 18.8%
n Federal Poverty Level
 <100% 12.8 8.7% 6.4 23.1% 49.8%
 100–199% 23.3 15.8% 9.4 33.9% 40.2%
 200–299% 24.3 16.5% 5.5 19.8% 22.5%
 300–499% 37.6 25.6% 4.0 14.3% 10.5%
 500%+ 49.0 33.3% 2.4 8.8% 5.0%
n Business Size (# Workers)
 Self-employed 13.5 9.2% 3.7 13.5% 27.6%
 <25 29.6 20.1% 9.8 35.4% 33.0%
 25–99 17.8 12.1% 3.7 13.6% 21.1%
 100–999 24.0 16.3% 3.7 13.5% 15.5%
 1000+ 41.0 27.9% 5.3 19.3% 13.0%
 Public Sector 21.2 14.4% 1.3 4.8% 6.2%
Source: Urban Institute tabulations of the 2007 Urban Institute tabulations of the 2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey.
Table 1. Characteristics of Uninsured Workers, 2006
 Employees Offer Take-Up Own ESI Any ESI
 (millions)    
Total Employees  113.6 78.6% 83.2% 65.4% 77.4%
n Federal Poverty Level
 <100% 7.7 39.8% 63.5% 25.2% 30.4%
 100–199% 17.1 60.3% 78.2% 47.1% 51.7%
 200–299% 19.0 76.9% 86.1% 66.2% 73.9%
 300–499% 31.7 84.9% 86.0% 73.0% 86.2%
 500%+ 38.0 90.3% 83.1% 75.1% 93.1%
n Firm Size 
 Under 10 14.5 45.7% 77.9% 35.6% 52.6%
 10–24 10.9 62.8% 76.8% 48.2% 63.1%
 25–99 15.6 78.1% 79.3% 61.9% 74.9%
 100+ 72.6 87.6% 85.2% 74.7% 85.1%
 
Source: Urban Institute tabulations of the 2007 Urban Institute tabulations of the 2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey. 
Note: Wage group estimates exclude cases with missing wage values; thus, the total number of employees reported in the wage group category is slightly lower than the total number of 
employees overall. A worker is deemed to have an employer offer of health insurance if their employer sponsors coverage and the worker is eligible to enroll in it.
Table 2. Employer Offer and Take-Up among Employees, 2005
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non-employment-related sources for 
them to obtain coverage using those 
subsidies. A focus on income differences 
as opposed to employer-size differences 
is supported by the fact that rates of 
having and being eligible for an ESI 
offer also vary dramatically by income, 
ranging from 40 percent of workers 
with family incomes below the poverty 
level to 90 percent for workers with 
family income of at least 500 percent 
of the federal poverty level (Table 2, 
column 2, top section). 
In this paper, we discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of employer versus 
individual subsidization in their ability 
to target financial assistance to those 
most in need of coverage. We start by 
explaining why small firms are less likely 
to offer ESI than are large firms, and why 
offers are more likely to be made in firms 
with higher-income workers. We use this 
background to describe the expected 
relative effectiveness of expanding 
coverage via employer versus individual-
level subsidies. We then consider specific 
design and policy issues associated with 
employer and individual subsidies.
Why ESI Offer Rates Vary 
by Firm Size and Worker 
Incomes2
Employers offer health insurance as 
a tool for attracting the workers they 
want to hire. In competitive labor 
markets, such a benefit may be critical 
to hiring the most qualified workers. 
In less competitive labor markets, or in 
labor markets where health insurance 
is not as highly valued by the types of 
workers being hired, employers are 
less likely to offer health insurance. 
An employer’s decision to offer 
coverage is a function of the price of 
insurance faced by the employer and 
the workers’ willingness to trade wages 
for health insurance. The former varies 
with employer size (larger firms can 
purchase the same benefits at lower 
prices than can smaller firms) and 
the latter varies with worker income 
(lower-income workers tend to prefer 
additional wages to employer health 
insurance contributions).
Unlike wages, employer payments 
toward workers’ health insurance are 
not taxed. Such a tax advantage is not 
generally available when an individual 
purchases health insurance directly, 
via the nongroup insurance market. 
So, there is a substantial financial 
incentive for workers to take part of 
their compensation as health insurance. 
Given that marginal tax rates increase 
with taxable income, this tax exclusion 
is of much greater value to those with 
higher incomes than to those with 
lower incomes. In addition, making a 
trade-off of wages for health insurance 
is a more difficult choice for those with 
less disposable income. Even for those 
lower-income workers who would prefer 
to make such a trade-off, the minimum 
wage limits the extent to which 
employer health insurance costs can 
actually be passed back to these workers. 
These realities combine to explain why 
lower-income workers would be less 
likely to seek out jobs with insurance 
offers and why employers with higher 
percentages of lower-income workers 
would be less likely to make such offers.
While smaller firms tend to have lower 
average-wage workers than do their 
larger firm counterparts, these wage 
differentials do not wholly explain the 
differences between small and large 
firms’ likelihood of offering insurance. 
Additional factors relate to the pricing 
of health insurance. First, insurers apply 
higher administrative loads to insurance 
purchased by small firms than to 
insurance purchased by large firms. This 
is because a significant share of insurers’ 
administrative costs is fixed (i.e., they 
do not vary by the size of the group); 
consequently, those administrative costs 
will be a larger percentage of benefits 
when spread over a small group than 
over a large group.3 Second, the variance 
of expected health care costs decreases 
as group size increases. In other words, 
a risk-pooling economy of scale accrues 
only to groups, and to greater degrees 
in larger groups. This price disadvantage 
for smaller groups can be substantial. 4 
Therefore, it is not surprising that small 
firms are significantly less likely to 
purchase insurance on behalf of their 
workers than are large firms.
In sum, while increasing the offer rate 
among small employers might appear 
an obvious strategy for increasing 
insurance coverage, doing so means 
pressing for an expansion of coverage by 
purchasers that are relatively inefficient 
at buying health insurance. Because 
small employer purchasers face higher 
prices for the same benefits and tend 
to face significant barriers related to 
having a lower-wage workforce, inducing 
a substantial share of currently non-
offering small employers to provide ESI 
absent a mandate would be difficult.
Employer Subsidies
Background  
The SHOP Act represents one approach 
to structuring employer subsidies, but 
employer subsidies can be structured in 
various ways. Subsidies to support the 
purchase of insurance coverage can be 
provided at different levels to employers 
of different sizes, they can be provided 
to employers based upon the number 
or share of low-wage workers that they 
have, they can be offered to employers 
with an average employee wage below 
a specified threshold, or they can be 
offered according to some combination 
of firm size and wage rate rules (e.g., 
firms with fewer than 25 workers 
and more than 50 percent of workers 
earning less than $10 an hour). The 
subsidy levels can be set at an absolute 
dollar level or a share of premium 
(perhaps subject to an upper limit), and 
they can vary by whether the worker 
purchases single or family coverage, by 
the wage of the workers, or by the price 
of available insurance in the area.
Subsidies can also be available only 
conditional on certain levels of 
employer and/or worker contributions 
toward insurance.5 Larger subsidies that 
make family health insurance affordable 
are more likely to increase employer 
offer rates, although they will also be 
more costly to the government that is 
financing them. 
The Issues 
Employer Subsidies Target Employer 
Characteristics, Not Worker Characteristics. 
Even given the diversity of design 
options, it is difficult to use employer 
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subsidies as a mechanism for efficiently 
targeting assistance to the uninsured. 
This is largely the result of the fact 
that employers generally hire a mix of 
low-wage and high-wage workers, even 
within small firms and even within firms 
with low average wages. Plus, low wage 
is not necessarily synonymous with 
low income. 
The low-income uninsured are spread 
across firm sizes and are employed 
in firms with higher-income workers 
as well as with insured workers. As 
a consequence, offering subsidies to 
particular types of firms will often direct 
financial assistance to some of those in 
the population that the policy intends to 
target as well as to some of those that it 
does not. 
While small firm workers are more 
likely to be low income than larger firm 
Table 3. Characteristics of Uninsured Workers, 18–64, Income Distribution by Firm Size, 2006
 Workers Percent of Uninsured Percent of Uninsured
 (millions) Workers (millions) Uninsured Rate
Total Workersk  147.1 100.0% 27.6 100.0% 18.8%
n Family Income Relative to the FPL    
 Self-Employed Workers
 <100% 1.2 8.6% 0.7 18.4% 57.2%
 100–199% 1.8 12.4% 0.9 23.2% 50.2%
 200–299% 2.0 13.9% 0.7 19.1% 36.9%
 300–499% 3.3 23.3% 0.8 20.5% 23.6%
 500%+ 5.9 41.8% 0.7 18.8% 12.1%
n Family Income Relative to the FPL 
 Firm Size of <25
 <100% 4.0 13.4% 2.4 23.9% 58.1%
 100–199% 6.6 22.0% 3.5 35.4% 52.6%
 200–299% 5.6 18.6% 2.0 20.5% 36.0%
 300–499% 7.1 23.4% 1.3 13.5% 18.8%
 500%+ 6.8 22.5% 0.7 6.7% 9.7%
n Family Income Relative to the FPL 
 Firm Size of 25–99
 <100% 1.6 8.7% 0.8 20.9% 49.3%
 100–199% 3.5 18.9% 1.5 39.1% 42.6%
 200–299% 3.3 17.9% 0.8 20.1% 23.0%
 300–499% 4.9 26.5% 0.5 13.7% 10.6%
 500%+ 5.2 28.1% 0.2 6.2% 4.5%
n Family Income Relative to the FPL 
 Firm Size of 100–999
 <100% 1.9 6.7% 0.9 27.1% 45.7%
 100–199% 4.0 14.2% 1.4 35.0% 34.9%
 200–299% 4.9 17.6% 0.8 21.1% 17.0%
 300–499% 7.6 27.3% 0.6 14.2% 7.4%
 500%+ 9.5 34.1% 0.3 8.0% 3.3%
n Family Income Relative to the FPL 
 Firm Size of 1,000+
 <100% 4.1 7.2% 1.7 27.1% 41.5%
 100–199% 7.4 13.2% 2.1 34.2% 28.5%
 200–299% 8.5 15.1% 1.1 18.2% 13.3%
 300–499% 14.7 26.2% 0.8 12.4% 5.2%
 500%+ 21.5 38.3% 0.5 8.1% 2.3%
Source: Urban Institute tabulations of the 2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey. 
Note: Family is defined as the health insurance unit, which includes spouses and dependent children.
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workers, as Table 3 (column 2) shows, 
only 35 percent of small firm (fewer 
than 25 employees) workers have 
family incomes below 200 percent of 
the federal poverty level (another 19 
percent have incomes between 200 and 
300 percent of the poverty level) and 
only 33 percent of small firm workers 
are uninsured (Table 1, last column). 
Further, employers have information on 
their workers’ wages, but not on their 
workers’ family incomes. Since low-wage 
workers are not always in low-income 
families (i.e., a low-wage worker may 
have a highly paid spouse), targeting 
subsidies to low-wage workers can be 
problematic. Consequently, subsidizing 
an employer with a low average wage or 
even providing subsidies based upon the 
number of low-wage workers in a firm 
will mean subsidizing some high-income 
workers as well. 
In addition, subsidies targeted to small 
firms would miss many low-wage 
workers employed in larger firms who do 
not have an offer of employer coverage. 
Forty-three percent of low-income 
uninsured workers are employed in 
firms of 100 or more workers.6 Research 
by Ferry and colleagues clearly shows 
that subsidies directed at individuals by 
income level are much more effectively 
targeted to the uninsured than are 
subsidies directed at those with low 
wages or in small firms.7 
Even Large Price Reductions will Not 
Necessarily Change Employer Offer 
Decisions. Employer subsidies of the 
levels being discussed are not likely to 
significantly change the rate at which 
small employers offer health insurance. 
Reschovsky and Hadley have estimated an 
elasticity of employer offer with respect 
to price of about 0.5 (i.e., a 10 percent 
reduction in premiums would result in a 
5 percent increase in the share of firms 
offering coverage).8 Other researchers 
have estimated different elasticities, but 
they are generally in this stated range.9 
Elasticities in the range of 0.5 would 
increase employer offer rates marginally. 
For example, 41 percent of small firm 
(fewer than 25 workers) establishments 
offered health insurance to their workers 
in 2005. A 30 percent reduction in 
premiums would increase that employer 
offer rate by 15 percent, moving it from 
41 to 47 percent, still less than half of the 
offer rate of establishments in firms of 
50 or more workers. The effect would be 
even smaller if not all workers benefited 
from the employer subsidy. For example, 
if subsidies were only available to low-
wage workers, the program might only 
benefit a small share of a given employer’s 
workforce, thus not sufficient to change 
the employer’s decision to offer health 
care coverage. The increase in employer 
administrative burden could also be a 
deterrent to changing the offer decision.
Employer Subsidies May Displace 
Significant Amounts of Private Spending. 
Employer subsidies also have the 
potential to displace a significant amount 
of private spending. The probability 
of having ESI increases with income. 
Unless subsidies are specifically targeted 
to low-income workers, it would be 
hard to avoid giving subsidies to many 
of those who currently have coverage. 
Thus, if employer subsidies do little to 
result in more firms offering coverage, 
the principal impact would be to help 
employers who are now offering and 
contributing to their workers’ coverage. 
Only some of these new subsidies will go 
to those without coverage. It is extremely 
difficult to exclude those employers 
previously covering some of or all their 
workers from subsidization. Attempting 
to do so creates inequities, with 
employers in similar financial situations 
treated differently, disadvantaging those 
employers and workers who have made 
potentially difficult financial trade-offs in 
order to provide insurance and to stay 
insured. Such rules might also provide 
incentives for those currently providing 
coverage to drop it, in order to become 
eligible for financial assistance. 
Employer Subsidies Are Unlikely to 
Increase Take-Up of Employer Offers. 
Approximately 30 percent of uninsured 
workers currently have access to an 
offer of employer-sponsored insurance 
(either through their own employer or 
through that of a spouse or parent) but 
do not take it up.10 Subsidies directed 
to employers will not directly increase 
the take-up rate of these workers. The 
exception would be if employers who 
previously provided coverage use the 
new subsidy to lower the workers’ share 
of the premium instead of using it to 
offset the employers’ own contribution.11 
Roughly half of the recent decline in ESI 
among poor workers is attributable to 
declines in take-up of offered coverage; 
take-up declines account for about 27 
percent of recent declines in ESI among 
workers overall.12 Subsidies to help offset 
employee costs would be required to 
stem the declines in take-up among low-
income workers. 
Continuing Need for Individual/Family 
Subsidies and Guaranteed Sources for 
Purchasing Coverage. Because employer 
subsidies alone will not induce all 
employers to voluntarily offer coverage 
to their workers, and because some of 
the uninsured are not connected to the 
workforce at all, significant expansions of 
coverage will require that the government 
also provide individual/family subsidies 
and a source for purchasing coverage 
directly to individuals. Such subsidies 
could be used to purchase coverage 
through existing insurance options 
(e.g., state or federal employee plans, 
the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP)), or through a new 
purchasing pool created for this purpose 
(for example, one like Massachusetts’ 
Commonwealth Connector).13
Finally, any policy attempting to build on 
the current system needs to recognize 
that small employers are not efficient 
purchasers of coverage. Not only are 
the administrative costs high, but small 
employers are also not able to bargain 
effectively with insurance companies 
over premiums. Providing incentives for 
small employers to purchase coverage 
on their own is unlikely to be an efficient 
solution to low coverage rates. The better 
approach is to develop options for small 
groups to purchase coverage either 
through existing purchasing entities or 
through new ones, as described above. 
Individual and Family 
Subsidies
Background 
Individual and family-level subsidies can 
be provided on an income-related basis 
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(e.g., with subsidies highest for the 
low income and decreasing as income 
goes up) or at a flat level regardless 
of income (e.g., a fixed refundable 
tax credit). Individual and family 
subsidies can be provided directly to 
individuals in the form of vouchers for 
the purchase of coverage, can be paid 
directly to the public or private insurer 
with which the individual enrolls, or 
can be structured as refundable tax 
credits that reimburse individuals for 
all or a part of the insurance costs they 
incurred in the prior year. 
The simplest form of individual subsidy 
is one in which a flat dollar amount is 
provided to those purchasing coverage. 
The amount may or may not vary with 
income, but it does not vary with the 
amount that the individual actually 
spends on coverage. Alternatively, 
individual subsidies could be set as a 
percentage of the premium, with an 
upper limit on the allowed premium. 
The percentage of the premium covered 
could decrease with increasing income. 
Another option is to structure the subsidy 
schedule as a cap on individual and family 
insurance payments at a percentage of 
income. The percentage of income cap 
could increase with increasing income. 
That is, the government subsidies would 
cover health insurance costs exceeding a 
specified percentage of a family’s income. 
Again, a maximum allowed premium 
could be set as well. 
The larger the subsidies provided, the 
greater voluntary participation will 
be and the more comprehensive the 
coverage individuals will be able to afford 
in terms of covered services, broadness of 
provider networks, and out-of-pocket cost 
protection. Of course higher subsidies 
also bring greater government costs 
and increased need for new sources of 
revenue and greater redistribution of 
financing responsibilities.
The Issues
Income-Related Individual/Family 
Subsidies Are Most Target Efficient. 
Because the likelihood of being 
uninsured falls dramatically as income 
rises (from 50 percent of poor workers 
to 5 percent of workers at or above 
500 percent of the poverty level, as 
shown in Table 1), providing assistance 
that increases as income falls would 
provide the greatest support to those 
least likely to have insurance without a 
subsidy. In addition, Ferry and colleagues 
have shown that providing subsidies 
specifically to low-income individuals 
and families is a more target efficient 
mechanism for subsidizing the uninsured 
and results in less displacement of 
existing private spending than providing 
subsidies to small firms or low-wage 
workers.14 This means that income-related 
subsidies lead to a lower government 
cost per newly insured person than 
would be the case when using employer 
subsidies or subsidies that do not vary 
with income. 
However, income-related individual 
subsidies may still result in significant 
displacement (or crowding-out) of 
current coverage.15 Efforts to prevent 
crowd-out, such as denying eligibility for 
subsidies to those previously insured, 
create inequities. Programs may be 
perceived as unfair if they disadvantage 
those who were previously making 
sizeable payments to get coverage relative 
to those who went uninsured, and they 
may undermine support for reforms. 
Subsidizing individuals with current 
coverage is fairer but more costly. 
Voluntary Participation Outside Employer 
Settings May Be Low. Take-up rates may 
not be particularly high in voluntary 
arrangements outside employer settings. 
Research shows that many individuals 
will not take up individual insurance even 
with reasonably generous subsidies.16 
Reducing stigma attached to receiving 
government support, ensuring that the 
time and hassle costs of enrolling for 
coverage are low (perhaps by using 
employers to assist with enrollment 
tasks), and making adequate coverage 
accessible at an affordable price outside 
the employment setting will be critical 
to achieving high levels of participation 
absent an individual mandate. Such 
strategies must include eliminating 
any financial liquidity constraints that 
might prevent individuals from having 
access to subsidies at the time premium 
payments are due, or any uncertainty 
about what the total subsidy amount 
will be before enrollment. The latter 
two are of particular concern under a 
refundable tax credit structure, where the 
subsidy is received once tax returns have 
been filed and subsidy amounts may be 
determined retrospectively using full-year 
taxable income. Strategies can likely be 
developed for effectively addressing these 
issues, but they require specific program 
design efforts to do so. 
A Guaranteed Source for Purchasing 
Individual/Family Coverage Is Necessary. 
Because 75 percent of the nonelderly 
uninsured do not have access to an 
employer-sponsored insurance offer (see 
Figure 1), an accessible non-employment-
related source for purchasing coverage 
is necessary. Over half the uninsured 
� No adult worker in family
� Adult worker in family; but declined ESI offer
� Adult worker in family; but no ESI offer
20%
25%
55%
Figure 1.  Distribution of the Non-Elderly Uninsured by Access to 
ESI Offer
Source: Urban Institute tabulations of a merged file of the 2005 Current Population Survey Contingent Worker & Annual 
Social and Economic Supplements.
Note: “Family” is defined as health insurance unit, which includes spouses and dependent children.
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have at least one adult worker in 
their family but none with an offer of 
employer-based coverage, and 20 percent 
have no attachment to the workforce. 
Most states allow private nongroup 
insurers to deny issue of coverage to 
individuals based upon health status, 
as well as charge higher premiums to 
applicants based upon their medical 
history. Many states also allow private 
nongroup insurers to exclude benefits 
for particular types of care from issued 
policies, based upon enrollees’ health 
experiences. As a consequence, even 
provided a government subsidy, many 
individuals would not have a guaranteed 
source available for purchasing adequate 
affordable coverage.
As suggested in the discussion of small 
employers, these issues for individual 
purchasers can be addressed by 
developing new insurance purchasing 
pools or by opening access to existing 
pools (e.g., government employee 
plans, SCHIP) for individual purchasers. 
Providing income-related subsidies only 
through such pools would attract many 
low-income healthy enrollees, helping 
to offset adverse selection in the pools 
that might result from their accessibility 
to the high-need population. However, 
it might also be necessary to subsidize 
coverage in the pool to further 
compensate for adverse selection, 
thereby keeping premiums affordable 
and attractive to voluntary enrollees of 
all levels of medical need.
Having subsidies provided only for 
coverage obtained through purchasing 
pools also simplifies the process of 
setting subsidy amounts consistent 
with available premiums for adequate 
coverage. The purchasing pool could 
set basic benefit levels for insurance 
provided there, negotiate premiums, 
and collect relevant data on enrollee 
health care risk from participating plans. 
Because the types of plans and benefit 
packages could be limited within the 
pool, information could be gathered and 
analyzed relatively easily and uniformly, 
without having to deal with the 
complexities of highly heterogeneous 
plan offerings in the outside market. 
Without subsidies being directly related 
to premiums for a particular level of 
coverage, there is no guarantee that 
low-income individuals would be able 
to access affordable coverage with 
meaningful benefits.
The System Is Not Currently Prepared for 
a Large-Scale Decline in Employer-Based 
Coverage. Subsidization approaches 
that increase incentives to purchase 
coverage in the private nongroup market 
will tend to undermine the employer-
based system, potentially dramatically 
decreasing the current 61 percent share 
of the nonelderly population obtaining 
coverage through employers.17 Without 
reforms to the ways in which individuals 
can purchase coverage on their own (e.g., 
the purchasing pools discussed above), 
combined with sufficient subsidies, 
such an approach may even increase 
the number of uninsured, particularly 
among the low income and those with 
higher than average health care needs. 
So, for example, simply “leveling the 
playing-field” of the tax treatment of 
employer and nongroup insurance is not 
as innocuous as it might sound. 
Even in the context of providing adequate 
and subsidized coverage through 
universally accessible purchasing pools, it 
may be difficult for policymakers to raise 
sufficient revenue to finance significant 
increases in coverage without continued 
support from employers. While large 
employers are likely to continue providing 
coverage directly to their workers even 
under such reforms, small employers and 
new businesses may be less likely to do 
so.18 Maintaining employer involvement 
can be accomplished by imposing 
participation requirements on all or some 
employers (e.g., through “pay or play”-
type mandates), the continuation of at 
least some of the tax advantage associated 
with employer-based insurance (e.g., 
capping the current tax exclusion but 
not eliminating it), providing some new 
employer subsidies in conjunction with 
individual subsidies, or by imposing 
crowd-out prevention strategies in a 
subsidized purchasing pool, such as 
those used by Massachusetts under its 
reform.19 While these approaches create 
some inequities and inefficiencies, 
they can be effective in guaranteeing 
continued employer participation in 
the health insurance arena. If, over 
time, non-employer-based options for 
obtaining insurance coverage are fully 
operational and proven to provide 
adequate substitutes to the employer-
based system, such approaches can be 
phased out and eliminated.
Conclusions 
Individual and family subsidies have some 
important advantages over employer 
subsidies. They are better at targeting 
lower-income people, the largest segment 
of the uninsured. Subsidies directed 
specifically at the low-income population 
will lead to less displacement of private 
spending because that population has 
low rates of current private coverage, 
although some displacement is still 
likely to occur. Subsidies based upon 
income treat those in similar economic 
circumstances similarly, eliminating the 
equity concerns associated with treating 
low-income people differently based 
upon their place of employment and 
prior decisions to purchase coverage. 
Because employer subsidies are provided 
based upon employer characteristics and 
the limited information that employers 
have about their workers (e.g., they know 
their wages but not their family income) 
and because workers within a firm can 
vary significantly, subsidies are much more 
difficult to target effectively to individuals 
with the greatest needs. In addition, 
employer subsidies do not eliminate the 
need for individual subsidies, as many 
employers will not voluntarily begin to 
offer coverage, low-income workers will 
continue to need additional financial 
support in order to afford coverage, and 
not all the uninsured are attached to the 
labor force.
Given these issues, it is probably best to 
rely primarily on individual and family 
income-related subsidies. Subsidies 
could be made available for workers and 
spouses with incomes up to at least 300 
percent of FPL through a purchasing pool. 
Subsidies could be based on a benchmark 
premium in the purchasing pool and 
could limit individual financial exposure 
to a specified percentage of income. 
Workers with employer coverage through 
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues     8
the purchasing pool could be offered 
similar protections. This arrangement 
would result in subsidies provided to 
people not only based on income, but 
to the extent that there was adverse 
selection into the pool, it would provide 
support to individuals with high health 
care costs. This combination of policies 
in a voluntary system would probably 
reduce the number of uninsured by 
about half. Further progress would 
require mandating that individuals and 
families obtain coverage.
Policymakers may want to keep health 
insurance offers by small employers as 
high as possible, given recent national 
trends, in order to reduce the level of 
new government revenues that must 
be raised to make coverage affordable 
for all. If such is the case, particularly 
in the early years of a reform, it is 
important that employer subsidies 
be specifically targeted for low-wage 
workers in small firms. The advantage 
of some targeted employer subsidies is 
that they may help to keep some small 
employers providing coverage, and 
those employer contributions can offset 
some of the costs of insurance that 
would otherwise fall to government. 
Minimum employer contributions to 
the cost of coverage could be required 
in order to qualify for subsidies, thus 
ensuring that employer subsidies would 
be lower than full individual subsidies. 
Employer subsidies would be available 
only through a purchasing pool that 
would be responsible for coordinating 
individual and employer contributions 
with employer subsidies and individual/
family subsidies. Such an approach would 
have the greatest impact on coverage if 
employer participation was mandated.
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